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Based on philosophical inquiries, this article attempts to inquiry and criticize the rise 
of relativism of truth in the post-truth condition and to reveal its relation with contemporary 
popular Islamic discourses in the public sphere. It cannot be denied that truth, both truth as a 
concept or as property, is an extremely basic concept and the philosopher’s value par 
excellence. Considering the extent of its scope, the inquiry of truth in philosophical discourse 
is often connected to the system of human belief, knowledge, concept of logic, language, and 
reality. The philosopher’s fascination in the discourse of truth could be deduced by three 
problems: how the truth acquired, the relation of truth to linguistic meaning, and the 
relation between truth and logic. In ancient philosophy, the idea of truth broadly refers to 
physical or natural order as truth’s ontological sine qua non. Different from classical 
philosophy, the truth in the realm of modern philosophy refers to the critical and self-
reflective subjectivity of the subject that seeks objective truth. While the key terms that 
illustrate the conditions of contemporary philosophical discourse are postmodernism which 
is characterized by the mistrust of the grand narratives. In contemporary age—the age of 
disruption which technology forms and accelerates human life and also driven by the 
mistrust of the grand narratives campaigned by postmodernism philosophical thought, the 
nature of truth undergoes some radical change. The symptom of radical changes that occur 
in truth value lies in the problem that feeling or believing something matter more than fact 
in shaping public opinion. At the level of academic discourses, the current situation is often 
expressed as the post-truth condition which is often characterized by the disappearance of 
objective truth—the prefix “post” does not refer to the temporal sense, but in the sense that 
truth has been eclipsed. In the post-truth condition, which relativism of truth is often at its 
peak, philosophical discourses, including Islamic philosophy, find its challenges. By inquiring 
about the nature of truth through ontological, epistemological, axiological, and semantical 
inquiries, this article seeks to a better understanding of the dynamics of philosophy in the 
post-truth condition and try to critically analyze and search for solutions to avoid the 
eclipsed truth based on the philosophical lens. 




The main issue illustrated by Heidegger when unfolding the situation of the 
modern (post-modern) reality is that the fundamental event of the modern age is 
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the conquest of the world as picture (Bild).1 As a philosopher who struggles with the 
problem of fundamental ontology that focuses on Dasein’s (Being-in-there) issues,2 
Heidegger’s expression indicates a radical change in the level of reality, even 
beyond the realm of metaphysical (ontology) discourse. Borrowing Lèvin’s 
interpretation in The Opening Vision, Heidegger’s phrase illustrates an exceeding 
reality which is termed “ontology of picture” or “ontology of image”.3 Images 
become so identical with the essence of modern metaphysics. When reality is 
dominated by images and accelerated by technology, human cultures undergoes in 
such radical changes, which also influences how truth manifests itself in reality.  
It cannot be denied that truth, both truth as a concept or as property, is an 
extremely basic concept and the philosopher’s value par excellence. Considering 
the extent of its scope, the inquiry of truth in philosophical discourse is often 
connected to the system of human belief, knowledge, concept of logic, language, 
and reality. In ancient philosophy, the idea of truth broadly refers to physical or 
natural order. Different from classical philosophy, the truth in the realm of modern 
philosophy refers to the critical and self-reflective subjectivity of the subject that 
seeks objective truth. While the key terms that illustrate the conditions of 
contemporary philosophical discourse are postmodernism which is characterized 
by the mistrust of the grand narratives.  
Driven by the mistrust of the grand narratives, the nature of truth undergoes 
some radical change. The symptom of radical changes that occur in truth value lies 
in the problem that feeling or believing something matter more than fact in 
shaping public opinion—the idea that things are true irrespective of how the 
people feel about them. As a consequence, the truth shifts from being substantive 
to a procedural notion. At the level of academic discourses, the current situation is 
often expressed as the post-truth condition which is often characterized by the 
                                                          
1 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture”, in Martin Heidegger, The Question 
Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), p. 134. 
2 Dasein is a typical term in Heidegger’s phenomenological thought which is often translated 
as Being-in-there. Other than that, the term Dasein is also used to indicate several other meanings, 
such as Being-in-the-world or Existing-in-the-world) and Being-toward-death. 
3 David Michael Lèvin, The Opening of Vision, 1st edition (New York & London: Routledge, 
1988), p. 119. 
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disappearance of the objective truth values. In other terms, the truth has been 
eclipsed, that is when facts become something passe.  
In the age of disruption in which technology forms and accelerates human life 
and also driven by the mistrust of the grand narratives campaigned by 
postmodernism philosophical thought, the reality of post-truth even becomes more 
massive. Adapting Derrida's spectrophetic hauntology when illustrating Mark's 
ideas, that a spectre is haunting truth—the spectre of populism. The problem is, why 
populism is so influential in the character of truth? The reason behind its influence 
on truth lies in the “empty heart” of populism: populism lacks a commitment to key 
values, except in its popularity. The truth is no longer measured by philosophical 
standards, but by emotions and mass beliefs that resonate in the public sphere and 
amplified in the cybersphere as the new media.  
The problem is whether the citizens have a say in the decisions that 
concern them in the public sphere, without being subject to coercion, then the 
conversation the public sphere always depending on the intellectual capacities of 
the people which also affects the value of truth. In the midst of contemporary 
cultural situations trapped in images and in the post-truth condition which 
“emotional” relativism of truth is often at its peak and also driven by mass hysteria, 
philosophical discourses, including Islamic philosophy, find its challenges. Thus, 
based on some issues described above, this article attempts to elaborate the nature 
of truth through ontological, epistemological, axiological, and semantical inquiries 
in the post-truth condition. This article also tries to critically analyze and search for 
solutions to avoid the eclipsed truth based on the philosophical lens. 
 
THE TRUTH THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
Truth is the goal of philosophical inquiry, even it is essentially contested 
among them—for in its absence, the bewilderment or lost or may even be facing 
the wrong way, on the wrong track altogether, are inevitable. As a basic concept of 
philosophical inquiry, truth is so tightly interconnected with so many other 
philosophically interesting concepts. Sometimes, truth is deeply connected to 
belief, to knowledge, to language, and to the central concept of logic as well, and 
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the most important, truth is related to another mysterious concept, reality. 
Sometimes, perhaps more often, the failure to seek the truth leads someone to put 
up with simplifications, metaphors, and even myths and fictions. To avoid the 
labyrinth of truth, philosophers have tried to think about truth and its relation to 
facts or reality. 
 Generally, the philosopher’s fascination with truth throughout the history of 
philosophy could be deduced by three problems: how the truth acquired, the 
relation of truth to linguistic meaning, and the relation between truth and logic. As 
an initial hypothesis, the truth has undergone a paradigm shift through history; 
from nature to history; from Being to politics; from history to language; and even 
from language to image. Thus, a philosophical inquiry concerning truth tries to find 
out how truth acquired or justified; what is the relation of truth to linguistic 
meaning; and what is the relation between truth and logic? Then in the age of the 
world as picture, what is the relation of truth to image? 
Historically we have understood the terms of truth as form (Plato), as 
substance (Aristotle), as agreement (medieval), as transcendental idealism (Kant), 
or as hermeneutical phenomenology and later as alētheia (Heidegger). This section 
will inquiry, briefly, the dynamic of truth in the history of philosophy, from ancient 
to contemporary philosophy, to understand the contemporary dynamic of the 
truth value in the post-truth condition. Considering that the philosophers interest 
concerning truth sometimes in the concept, sometimes in the underlying nature of 
the property, and sometimes in both, the inquiry itself based on two main 
questions, truth as a concept (the theoretical aspect) and a property (the 
substantive aspect).4 These questions are based on the central questions which 
                                                          
4 In simple terms, both as a concept or as a property, the truth accumulates in robust and 
deflationist theories. According to Lynch elaboration, robust theories assume that truth is an 
important property that requires a substantive and complex explanation. In this case, the robust 
theories concern the objectivity of truth. Thus, the key issue for robust theories of truth is realism. 
But since the beginning of the last century, deflationists have suspected that the so-called problem 
of truth was a pseudo-problem. Deflationists hold that there is no single robust property shared by 
all the propositions we take as true. Consequently, our concept of truth should not be understood as 
expressing such a property but be seen as fulfilling some other function. In another word, robust 
theorists argue that the various mysteries of truth require substantive metaphysical explanation, 
while deflationists believe that no such explanation is needed. Michael P. Lynch, “Introduction: The 
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are, first, does truth even have nature? and second, if it does, what sort of nature 
does it have?  
As a starting point, Aristotle statement in Metaphysics is a good entrance to 
start an inquiry concerning the question of truth in philosophy; that is about the 
impossibility for there to be anything in the middle between contradictories which 
based on non-contradiction principle of logic, but it is necessary either to affirm or 
to deny one thing. The impossibility was illustrated by Aristotle that “For to say of 
what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, whereas to say of what is 
that it is, or what is not that it is not, is true” [1011b25-29].5 In another section which 
illustrated the priority of things then thought, Aristotle said that “For falsehood 
and truth are not in the thing, as if the good were true and the bad straightaway 
false, but in thought” [1027b25-27].6 
In Allen interpretation, Aristotle’s definition synthesizes three assumptions 
about the truth or false related to the problem of nature, Being, and language. First, 
the priority of nature over language, culture, or the effects of historical experience. 
Second, the idea that truth is a kind of sameness, falsity a difference, between what 
is said and what there is. And third, the secondary and derivative character of the 
sign by which truth is symbolized and communicated.7 Based on this 
interpretation, as Allen observes, to think of truth is to think of truth as something 
that a statement has because of something else’s being one way and not another. 
Truth’s value consists in its adequacy to this “something else”—to beings that are 
there by nature (a principle or source or archē residing in the thing themselves and 
responsible for their characteristic behavior), and the modifications and 
interferences they undergo.8  
The idea that truth is a statement that it is in adequacy to “something else”, 
whether the source or the target, interpreted in many ways. In ancient Greek 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Mystery of Truth”, in The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Michael P. Lynch 
(ed.), 1st edition (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), p. 3-4. 
5 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
2016), p. 65. 
6 Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 103. 
7 Barry Allen, Truth in Philosophy (USA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 9-10. 
8 Barry Allen, Truth in Philosophy, p. 10. 
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philosophy, the idea of truth generally related to nature (phusis) as truth’s 
ontological sine qua non.9 As Collingwood observes, when a Greek writer contrasts 
phusis (nature) with technē (skill) or phusis with bia (behavior) he implies that 
things have a principle of growth, organization, and movement, in their own right 
and that this is what he means by their nature; and when he calls things natural he 
means that they have such a principle in them.10 Thus, the truth is close to a matter 
of saying it like it is which involves an ability to articulate things in a way they 
express themselves; to speak the truth is to speak of reality as it is. 
Aristotle’s definition concerning truth itself interpreted by many modern and 
contemporary philosophers. Realist philosophers hold on a proposition that it is 
true just when it corresponds to reality. They assume that the root behind realism 
is that truth not on us but the world. Then the basic assumption for the realists is 
that the root behind realism is that truth not on us but the world. While the idealist 
philosophers assume that but the problem of truth is the problem in degree of 
realization within the mind as an ideally coherent system of judgments. They 
assume that the foundation of truth is the systematic coherence system of 
judgment which characterized a significant whole. Thus, the foundation of truth is 
the systematic coherence system of judgment which characterized a significant 
whole.  
For realist philosophers, the truth has a nature and that its nature is 
objective, so that not depend on what anyone believes or subjective value. 
According to R. J. Hirst, the traditional doctrine about realism is: 
The view that material objects exist externally to us and 
independently of our sense experience. Realism thus 
opposed to idealism, which holds that no such material 
objects or external realities exist apart from our knowledge 
or consciousness of them, the whole universe thus being 
                                                          
9 According to Charles H. Khan, the Greek concept of Being takes its rise from pre-
philosophical notion of “reality” as whatever it is in the world that makes some statement true and 
others false, some opinions correct and other mistaken. C. H. Kahn, “Retrospect on the Verb ‘to be’ 
and the Concept of Being”, in The Logic of Being, S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (Dordrecht: Redel, 
1986), p. 22. 
10 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 81-82. 
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dependent on the mind or in some sense mental. (Hirst 
1967: 77)11 
 
This is the foundation of classical truth known as the correspondence theory of 
truth which contains the truth bearer (the property of truth), the truth relation 
(the correspondence of truth), and the truth maker (the reality of truth). 
There are two dimensions of realism in traditional doctrine: a claim about 
what entities exist and a claim about their independent nature.  In Devitt’s 
interpretations, for the realist, the world exists independently of the mental. It is 
something external and objective which is not constituted by our knowledge, by 
our epistemic values, by our capacity to refer to it, by synthesizing power of the 
mind, by our imposition of concepts, theories, or languages. For an object has 
objective existence, it exists and has its nature whatever we believe, think, or can 
discover: it is independent of cognitive activities of the mind. The claim that 
something objectively exists independently of the mental also commits realism 
only on an undifferentiated, uncategorized, external world, the “thing-in-itself”.12 
The problem is, to what degree is the external world considered true?  
Bertrand Russel argues that it is beliefs that are true or false and facts that 
make beliefs true. Russel’s argument based on three propositions. First, the theory 
of truth must be such as to admit of its opposite, falsehood. Second, if there were no 
beliefs there could be no falsehood, and no truth either, in the sense in which truth 
is correlative to falsehood. And third, the truth or falsehood of a belief always 
depends upon something which lies outside the belief itself.13 Therefore, a belief is 
true when it corresponds with a certain complex unity (a fact) and false when it 
does not. The problem is, since we cannot step outside of our beliefs to identifying 
the truth, we cannot ever check to see if they correspond to the world or not. We 
can never know whether our beliefs are true. 
                                                          
11 Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2nd edition (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1984), p. 13. 
12 Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, p. 14-15, 17. 
13 Bertrand Russel, “Truth and Falsehood”, in The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary 
Perspectives, Michael P. Lynch (ed.), p. 18. 
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Unlike Russel, J. L. Austin argues that truth is not a property of beliefs, but 
rather the linguistic conventions. Austin insists that correspondence is nothing but 
conventional. As an apparatus for naming and predication, language determines 
whether the particular state of affairs (a referential fact) referred to is of the 
appropriate type to make the statement true. In his essay, Austin explains that 
there are two sets of conventions: Descriptive conventions correlating the words 
(=sentences) with the type of situation, thing, even, etc., to be found in the world. 
Demonstrative conventions correlating the words (=sentences) with the historic 
situation, etc., to be found in the world.14 Therefore, a statement is said to be true 
when the historic state of affairs corresponds with the sentence used to describes 
it, or the truth of a sentence consists in the reference of its parts to objective 
reality. 
Terence Horgan presents another version of the correspondence theory 
which allows for both direct and indirect word to world relations which he calls 
“contextual semantics”. In his essay, Horgan argues that contextual semantics is 
intermediate between referentialism (referential semantics) with its conception of 
truth as direct language-world correspondence and neopragmatism (neo-
pragmatist semantics) with its radically epistemic construal of truth. In short, truth 
is semantically correct assertibility; falsity is semantically correct deniability. It is 
never epistemic, but semantic correctness, since it involves a type of 
correspondence with the world. This is because the semantic norms governing 
truth can vary with context. Thus, there is a spectrum of ways in which statements 
can correspond to the world.15 
Unlike realist philosophers, idealist philosophers assume that to think of a 
thing is to get that thing itself in some degree within the mind. According to Lynch, 
the truth in an idealist view is a thought and its object do not differ in kind but in 
degree of realization. Hence, the purpose of thought is to become more developed 
and coherent until it literally is identical to, or ‘‘one with,’’ reality. In short, a 
                                                          
14 J. L. Austin, “Truth”, in The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Michael 
P. Lynch (ed.), p. 28. 
15 Terence Horgan, “Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical Realism: Truth as Indirect 
Correspondence”, in The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Michael P. Lynch 
(ed.), p. 70-71. 
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judgment is true when and only when it is a member of an ideally coherent system 
of judgments. Because the coherence theory stresses that truth consists in the 
coherence, or mutual support, of our beliefs, it is common to label the coherence 
theory as an ‘‘epistemic’’ conception of truth.16 
Contemporary epistemologist Linda Martìn Alcoff claim that in some sense, 
the truth is relative. This is because systems of knowledge are at least partly the 
product of one’s historical situation. Alcoff labeled her theory as “immanent 
realism” which based on an immanent account of knowledge, against the 
transcendental account of foundationalism. That is, for coherentism, knowledge is 
ultimately a product of phenomena that are immanent to human belief systems 
and practices, social organizations, and lived reality, whereas for foundationalism, 
if a belief is to count as knowledge, it must ultimately be able to establish some link 
to transcendent phenomena or something that is entirely extrinsic to human 
existence. This claim stands on the impossibility for human beings to remove all 
traces of our engaged concern with the world and the substantive conceptual 
models and interpretive systems we use to make sense of the world.17 
Unlike the realists or idealists, pragmatist philosophers argue that truth 
consists in its practical effects on human experience. Instead struggling theoretical 
or propositional problems, the truth in pragmatists has much to do with practical 
experience as a part of a matter of human interests and attitudes. In classical 
pragmatism, as Charles Peirce argues in his essay, the whole of our conception of 
the object based on our conception of the effect, directly or indirectly, of the 
sensible world.18 Therefore, the truth of judgment consists in its continuous 
practical use in human lives.  
Different from classical pragmatism, the contemporary pragmatism, for 
example in Putnam’s philosophical thought, combining it with realism which he 
termed internal (pragmatic) realism. In his essay, Putnam argues that in an 
                                                          
16 Michael P. Lynch, “Coherent Theories: Introduction”, in The Nature of Truth: Classic and 
Contemporary Perspectives, Michael P. Lynch (ed.), p.99. 
17 Linda Martìn Alcoff, “The Case for Coherence”, in The Nature of Truth: Classic and 
Contemporary Perspectives, Michael P. Lynch (ed.), p.162-163. 
18 Charles Sander Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”, in The Nature of Truth: Classic and 
Contemporary Perspectives, Michael P. Lynch (ed.), p. 202. 
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internalist view, signs do not intrinsically correspond to objects, independently of 
how those signs are employed and by whom. But a sign that is actually employed 
in a particular way by a particular community of users can correspond to 
particular objects within the conceptual scheme of those users. “Objects” do not 
exist independently of conceptual schemes.19 Therefore, unlike external realists, 
the internal realist believes that the totality of objects is not metaphysically fixed, 
because objects themselves exist only relative to conceptual schemes.  
In phenomenology tradition, the truth is not as simple as correspondence 
between thought and reality. Phenomenology related to the principle of how, in 
Husserl term, we “back to the thing them self” (zu den Sachen selbst),20 or, in 
Heidegger term, as “the process of letting things manifest themselves” (als das 
Sichzeigenlassen der Sache selbst).21 Thus, if the usual concept of truth is 
correspondence or coherence between subject and object, phenomenological 
tradition changes, radically, the conception of truth that is not a static-binary 
relation between subject’s representation of an object and the object itself, but the 
product of an activity that present the world directly as reviving our living contact 
with reality. 
As part of postmodernism (post-structuralism) traditions which is 
characterized by the distrust of the grand narratives, Foucault assume that truth is 
by nature political. Through his essay, he argues that truth isn’t outside power, or 
lacking in power. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of 
multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Truth is to be 
understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation and operation of statements. Truth is linked in a circular 
relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of 
power which it induces and which extend it. A “regime “of truth.22  
                                                          
19 Hilary Putnam, “Two Philosophical Perspective”, in The Nature of Truth: Classic and 
Contemporary Perspectives, Michael P. Lynch (ed.), p. 253. 
20 Edmund Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigation, trans. J. N. Findlay, 1st edition (London: 
Routledge, 2001), p. xxviii. 
21 Martin Heidegger, “Preface”, in William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to 
Thought, 4th (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), p. xxii. 
22 Michael Foucault, “Truth and Power”, in The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary 
Perspectives, Michael P. Lynch (ed.), p. 317-318. 
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Another significant conception concerning truth is relativism. In the history 
of Western philosophy, the first known statement of a relativist position is 
Protagoras (c. 490–420 BC), the Sophist with his famous dictum “man is the 
measure of all things.” The basic notion of relativism, as Ulf Zackariasson explains, 
is the human awareness difference which creates a kind of cognitive dissonance. 
The formula is simple enough: some properties (X)we may ascribe to X are such 
that they are determined by X’s standing relative to Y. X can, for instance, be an 
object that is small relative to object Y (or a set of objects) and yet be big relative to 
Z (or another set of objects).23  So, perhaps, it is no so surprising that truth, from 
the relativist point of view, is always related to the plurality in life styles, 
worldviews, value, and much else—the plurality that leads to an acute awareness 
of difference. Thus, truth never appears in its purity, but always relational—
related to—and contextual. 
If the problem of truth was polarized into and interplay critically among 
many philosophical thoughts throughout the history of philosophy, then what kind 
of philosophical current issues and dynamics concerning the truth in the 
contemporary era, especially in the era of technological culture? 
 
THE AGE OF THE DIGITAL IMAGE AND THE EMERGENCE POST-TRUTH 
CONDITION 
1. Image and The Imaginal Truth 
Technology has changed the rules of interaction in politics, religions, 
and society at large. In the age of technological culture, how human thinks 
and talks about truth has changed; from the oral tradition in ancient world to 
the basis for digital logic in contemporary era. At the time dominated by oral 
and written traditions, language becomes a fundamental instrument for 
truth-teller, meanwhile image, especially algorithmic images which can be 
programmed, becomes the fundamental even for revealing the truth when 
everything digitalized. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to define the current 
                                                          
23 Ulf Zackariasson, “Introdiction: Engaging Relativism and Post-Truth”, in Relativism and 
Post-Truth in Contemporary Society, Mikael Stenmark, et al. (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018), p. 4. 
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contemporary world as an imaginal culture; a world which characterized by a 
totalizing tendency to see things, the truth of things, in terms of images.  
Based on Heidegger’s hypothesis, as mentioned earlier, the 
fundamental event of the modern (postmodernism) age is the conquest of the 
world as picture (Bild). The term picture (Bild) here does not mean the 
picture of the world, but the world imagined, understood, and even embraced 
as an image—the reality in image representation, which is then considered as 
reality itself. The imagined world is reduced in such a way as a reality that 
controlled and colonized by images. 
Regarding the question of the image, Lechte asserts that the image is 
one of the most enigmatic entities—perhaps, more enigmatic than language 
system with which it has intimate relations. This suggests that the image has 
always been more than a representation, more than an analogy, or 
analogon—more than a resemblance between image and object.24 In Vernant 
term when elaborating Plato’s mimēsis theory, the image as an expression of 
different kinds of appearance belongs entirely on the side of “phenomena”, of 
the sensible world with its inconsistencies, contradictions, and relativities. 
This still puts the image on the side of phenomena of sensible world with its 
inconsistencies, contradictions, and relativities.25  
In addressing Heidegger’s hypothesis concerning ontology of image, the 
question—the naïve question—that immediately come to mind, then, is: 
What is an image? And in an equally naïve answer: An image can be a picture, 
whether pictographic, photographic, painterly, cinematographic, televisual, 
videographic—all of these would be examples of images. However, besides 
the naïve question-answer, there are a lot of paradoxes behind the image, 
ontologically, which requires deeper research, especially in relation to the 
digital age. Thus, the fundamental question about the ontology of image is 
                                                          
24
 John Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and Its Digital Future, 1
st
 edition 
(New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 6. 
25
 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “The Birth of Images”, in Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essay 
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concerned with the question of the image as it is; Is the image an object like 
other physical objects? Or essentially not a thing in its own right?   
If ontology is possible only as phenomenology, as Heidegger assumes,26 
then the ontology of image is only possible to be discussed as far as it is 
revealed as a phenomenon. According to Heidegger:  
Phenomenon—the self-showing in itself—means a 
distinctive way something can be encountered. On the 
other hand, appearance means a referential relation in 
beings themselves such that what does the referring (the 
making known) can fulfill its possible function only if it 
shows itself in itself—only if it is a “phenomenon.” Both 
appearance and semblance are founded in the 
phenomenon, albeit in diﬀerent ways. The confusing 
multiplicity of “phenomena” designated by the terms 
phenomenon, semblance, appearance, mere appearance, 
can be unraveled only if the concept of phenomenon is 
understood from the very beginning as the self-showing in 
itself.27 
 
In the Greek thought and culture, image related with the issue of eikōn 
(image or likeness), eidōlon (second like object, the replica or duplication of 
the first, double or simulacrum), phantasia (appearance), and phantasma 
(semblance). The terms emerge from the activity of presenting the invisible 
through imitation of appearance. Thus, whatever their differences, all come 
under the heading of mimēsis, of imitation. As Vernant explained, for Plato, 
everything in human life that is classified as eidōpoiikē, of the activity that 
fabricates an image-everything that belongs to the domain of mimētikē 
(demiurgy of images—a fabrication of images, not of realities). Meanwhile, 
the Sophist maintains a distinction between two forms eidōpoiikē; produces 
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 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996), p. 31. 
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 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 27. 
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icon-copies (eikōnes) that resemble their models by reproducing their actual 
proportions, on the contrary, produces simulacra-phantasms (phantasmata) 
by sacrificing the exact proportions and substituting those that will create an 
illusion in the eyes of the spectators.28 This suggests that the image 
appearance as the self-showing in itself has an essential connection with the 
reality, while the simulacrum-phantasms as semblance has cut off the image 
from the reality. 
To grasp the nature of the image ontologically, the image as image, the 
concept of reality and truth are to be elaborated. Following Letchte’s 
elaboration, true knowledge can only be a knowledge of what is real and, in 
this regard, no image, representation, or craftsman’s object can even 
approximate reality as what is real. Thus, the reality is not accessible to belief 
or to phantasy as appearance, but to the ability to see. To see, then, is not to 
engage with a semblance or with an imitation of reality; it is instead 
equivalent to an engagement with the truth itself.29 Consequently, the image 
is another form of appearance; that is, as Vernant explained, eidōlon which 
manifests both a real presence and an irremediable absence at the same time. 
It is this inclusion of a “being elsewhere” in the midst of a “being here” that 
constitutes the archaic eidōlon.30 This suggests that there is indeed a reality 
of illusion of an image as much as there is a reality of truth as what is an 
image; what is not (non-being) becomes no less real than what is (being).  
The play of presence and absence, of being-here and being-elsewhere, 
of the Same and the Other, has raised to a paradox about the question of 
image. These paradoxes referring to the problem that, in Aristotle 
illustration, one who did not perceive anything would neither learn nor 
understand anything, and whenever one contemplates, one necessarily at the 
same time contemplates a sort of image; for images are just as perceptions are, 
                                                          
28
 Jean-Pierre Vernant, “The Birth of Images”, p. 165, 169. 
29
 John Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and Its Digital Future, p. 14-15. 
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except without matter [432a8-10],31 or borrowing Heidegger’s term, in the—
mode of—consciousness of a picture (image), there is the picture-thing 
(image-thing) and the pictured (the imagined).32  
The paradox has brought the ontological problem of the image to an 
understanding that an image is not identical with itself. Because, following 
Lechte’s argumentation, to turn the image into a self-identical thing is to 
evacuate the image’s content as image. If an image is equated with a thing or 
object—as is implied by the notion of an image as having a phenomenal 
form—the very possibility of distinguishing its essential quality as an image 
is lost. By contrast, those who cast the image in the role of the pure image, of 
the simulacrum—even if it be a simulacrum produced by modern 
technology—turn the image into a thing. If everything (including an image) is 
a thing, there is no image. By this, they turn the image into an identity and 
render it identical with itself as it is not a thing.33 In Sartre’s term, the 
paradox—considering that the image is something which brings to presence 
what is absent, thus the image becomes the presence of the thing in its 
absence—can be perceived as part of a “naïve ontology” which based on the 
“illusion of immanence”, where images are put on the same plane as things, 
giving both the same type of existence.34  
The illustration concerning the reality of the image above suggests that 
the image is not simply as a mimētikē of reality, as eikōn or as eidolon. It also 
suggests that the truth of images lies in the interpretation of its self-showing, 
both as appearance or semblance. In the technological era—where the key to 
digital technologies is not their “immateriality” but the fact that they can be 
“programmed”, the challenge is how images have changed the mode of 
                                                          
31
 Aristotle, De Anima, trans. Cristopher Shieldes, 1
st
 edition (United Kingdom: Calderon Press-
Oxford, 2016), p. 65. 
32
 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegonema, trans. Theodore Kisiel 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 42. 
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 John Lechte, Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image and Its Digital Future, p. 19, 109. 
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consciousness in radical ways. As Lev Manovich points out, as cited by 
Lechte, that:  
New media change our concept of what an image is—
because they turn the viewer into an active user. As a 
result, an illusionistic image is no longer something a 
subject simply looks at, comparing it with memories of 
represented reality to judge its reality eﬀect. The new 
media image is something the user actively goes into, 
zooming in or clicking on individual parts with the 
assumption that they contain hyperlinks (for instance, 
image maps in Web sites). 
 
Thus, according to Manovich, the image in the traditional sense no longer 
exists and becomes interactive. The image becomes a virtual thing which is 
no longer something static that the subject staring at, but carries the subject 
actively goes into. Therefore, the interactive nature of images in the age of 
new media is one of the conditions that ignites and accelerates the post-
reality conditions. 
In the reality of the world as picture (image), humans are faced with a 
situation, as termed Baudlirllard, hyper-reality (beyond reality). In semiotics, 
what is called hyper in various phenomena of life (commodities of 
information media, fashion, sexuality, music, religion, etc.) can be interpreted 
as a condition of “sign domination” spread in various aspects of reality. As 
explained by Pialang, hyper-reality can be interpreted as a condition of 
mingling and overlapping of various forms of signs in a representation space. 
Thus, between the original/false, the past/present, natural/artificial, 
facts/fiction cannot be distinguished anymore; blend and overlap, then 
create a space for the indeterminate of meaning.35 The blurring of the reality 
boundary and the overlapping conditions of the sign have an impact on the 
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rampant condition of pathology, the image and parody of false subjectivity 
that appear in portraits of ego-logical narcissism.36 
Narcissism itself is an existential situation dominated by images. In the 
context of “ontology of image”, narcissism can be understood as a symptom 
of mental illness (psycho-pathology) which subject’s ego obsessed with an 
image. Based on this meaning, essentially, narcissistic psycho-pathology is 
related to the relationship between image and existential suffering of 
subject’s ego that obsessed with an image, even though the reality displayed 
in an image does not have any relationship with real reality. Thus, the 
pathology of narcissism manifests the suffering of the ego—the subject 
trapped in his own “ontology of image”, trapped in a reality of representation. 
When the subject entangled in the reality of the image, the subject is not only 
cut off from the real-reality, but at the same time alienated from themselves 
(the self) along with their existential authenticity. So, what emerges is false 
subjectivity. 
In the age when reality appears in representation of an image, what 
determining and defining reality—social, political, economic, even religious 
realities—is only the images, not reality in itself. The representation of reality 
as an image illustrates the subject’s desire to rule, dominate, and control the 
daily life of the world by, mostly, manipulating the image of the world. 
Everything becomes fully identified through the image, thus losing its 
essential touch with its own objective reality. Image of reality is the only way 
the subject rules and controls his reality.  
When the development of information technology experiences a 
massive leap—accompanied by an abundance of signs that transcend the 
cognitive, affective, and motoric capacities of human beings to interpret it 
(hyper-semiotics) because of technological acceleration, thus losing its 
                                                          
36
 In Peperzak’s explanation, egology is the theoretical side of a more fundamental attitude: the 
egocentrism of Western civilization realizes itself in a peculiar way of life, which is philosophy is the 
theoretical counterpart. Objectification, material pleasure, and the privilege accorded to seeing, 
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adequate reflective bases—the psychic structure and the daily behaviour of 
human beings becomes very closely related to the parodies of false 
subjectivity that roam on various social mediums. The parody of false subject 
imagery in posters, advertisements, television, and other technological 
mediums, has played a major role in obscuring the objective reality, both 
social, political, economic, even religious realities, then reduced to imaginal 
realities that are not essential. This phenomenon has an impact on the 
increasingly blurred reality behind image parodies. 
Starting from this explanation of the fundamental event of the modern 
age, it can be understood that narcissism illustrates the subject’s pathology: a 
pathology in which the subject’s will to power is truly trapped in the 
projected image. The reality of human beings become very determined by the 
image, not the reality that lives and lived in self-experience. In the situation of 
the colonized reality by the reality of images, the reality of the world has 
entered into the condition of the death of reality (post-reality), which at the 
same time necessitates the emergence of post-truth conditions. 
 
2. The Post-Truth Conditions and the Collapse of Objective Truth 
It's not an exaggeration to say that the awareness of difference in late-
modern societies leads to the condition which objectivity and truth have 
fallen. The awareness of difference also leads to a condition where skeptical, 
relativistic and truth-indifferent attitudes increasingly dominate intellectual, 
public and social life,37 although it can also, at some point, lead to a critical 
awareness about the possibilities of the rise of hegemonic ideologies whose 
power can be detected in institutional practice of dominance and oppression. 
In a negative sense, the condition is often termed as post-truth condition 
which seem to depend upon self-referential data points.  
According to Lee McIntyre, the phenomenon of post-truth itself 
rocketed to public attention in November 2016, following the UK’s Brexit and 
the US presidential campaign and election, that is when Oxford Dictionaries 
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announced post-truth as its word of the year.38 The public attention has 
placed post-truth a mainstay in academic, even public discourses, after 
previously being only a peripheral term. Many see post-truth as a global 
phenomenon where reality bends to fit self-referential opinions, interests, 
and intentions. This does not mean that facts do not matter, but instead a 
conviction that facts can always be shaded, selected, presented, and even 
manipulated, according to one interpretation of truth over another. 
The Oxford Dictionaries web page defines post-truth as an adjective 
“relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less 
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal 
belief.39 The truth is nothing but the product of emotions—the idea that 
feelings sometimes matter more than facts. The questions are, what is the 
meaning contained in the prefix “post”? if post-truth is understood as 
objectiveless fact, then what is the difference with lies and spin? 
Undoubtedly, to understanding something like post-truth condition 
requires careful contextualization. That is because there is a fundamentally 
different phenomenon about post-truth than something like lying or spin. In 
Michael Sawyer interpretation, lying statement is a statement that is at a 
discernible distance from an identifiable objective fact, while spin is 
principally understood as a phenomenon of strategies of political messaging. 
This means something like the observation of a set of facts, that can then be 
manipulated for political advantage. Post-truth condition is a different 
phenomenon that allows for the later refutation of objective facts, but rests 
upon establishing an archive (that is accessible to and understandable by the 
public) of self-referential evidences that are not verifiable through other 
methods.40 This suggests that the prefix “post” does not refer to the temporal 
sense, but in the sense that truth has been eclipsed, banished from 
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 Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2018), p. 1. 
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establishing objective fact. in this sense, the prefix “post” illustrates the 
condition of destabilization or even the destruction of the factual truth. 
Bruce McComiskey explains that in its current usage, post-truth signifies 
a state in which language lacks any reference to facts, truths, or realities. 
When language has no reference to facts, truths, and realities, it becomes a 
purely strategic medium, thus becomes purely strategic, without reference to 
anything other than itself.41 At this point, the truth shifts from being 
substantive to a procedural notion. Besides, it is worth stressing, as Fuller 
said, that a post-truther does not deny the existence of facts, let alone 
“objective facts”. She simply wishes to dispel the mystery in which the 
creation and maintenance of facts tend to be shrouded.42 At this point, 
“Evidence” is the key concept to identify the post-truth condition, because it 
feeds directly into the popular image as “post-fact” or “false-factum.” 
Different from a purely fact-based conception of evidence from, post-fact, 
Fuller argues, understood as a willful denial of solid, if not incontrovertible, pieces 
of evidence.43 If it refers to the definition put forward by Oxford Dictionary, then 
the act of willful denial based on emotional revelation concerning evidence. These 
actions ignite a chaotic cacophony and discordant voices, at least, on two level, 
language rhetoric and image. At the level of language rhetoric, post-truth condition 
appears in form of bullshits, fake news, hoaxes, etc., while at level of image, it 
appears in form of framed image. In this post-truth condition, both language and 
image become purely strategic, without reference to evidence other than itself. 
Which mean, a statement or a meme, in a given situation, is truth if it is as desired; 
it is false if it is it doesn’t work as desired, without any regard to the truth value or 
evidence. 
 
POPULAR DISCOURSE IN CYBER-PUBLIC SPHERE 
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1. Populism 
Populism has its first and foremost origin within the context of political 
competition which deals with the political capacities of the people.44 The 
political context indicates, as Colliot-Thélène argued, that in so far as the 
populus of populism must have some kind of relation with the demos of 
democracy, an analysis of populism always engages a determined conception 
of democracy.45 Thus, it is nothing outrageous to rely on popular sovereignty 
to demand, in the name of democracy, that the people have a say in the 
decisions that concern them. This, however, may serve populism in a 
negative sense as well as a positive sense, depending on intelligence 
capacities of the people. The political background also gives us an initial 
understanding that the term populism can be examined through two 
directions. The first direction is a question about populism as a term or 
concept which characterize the present conjuncture. The second is a question 
about populism and its relation with the rise of post-truth condition in the 
digital age in public sphere. 
As a concept, populism is an unusual and an ambivalent concept. To be 
an unusual concept considering that populism tends not to have an 
ideological framework as liberalism or conservatism which are based on 
well-articulated principles. To be ambivalent concept referring to its 
“chameleonic character”—populism can be used in a positive or negative 
sense as an adjective attached to other ideas. In a negative sense, populism 
associated with the irrationality of the masses, surface, low, ordinary 
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 Acording to Hadiz, in Europe, populist politics have been associated closely in recent years with 
anti-immigration tendencies represented by politicians like the Le Pens in France, Fortuyn and Wilders in 
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consciousness, while in a positive sense with the sovereignty of the “masses” 
against the corrupt “elites” and the “system”. This explains why populist 
movement often be an episodic phenomenon. Therefore, its broad usage also 
creates confusion and frustration. This presents both an advantage and a 
challenge, for how to write about something that is still evolving, unusual and 
ambivalent. 
Taggart gives an illustration that the effort to capture the essence of 
populism have sprung up at different times and in different places, but it is 
very difficult to see a consistent pattern. At different times and in different 
places it has been a force for change, a force against change, a creature of 
progressive politics of the left, the refuge of a measured defense of the status 
quo and a companion of the extreme right. Most have seen populism as 
specific to the context in which they are focused. The more ambitious have 
attempted to define populism in universal terms. Others have portrayed it as 
variegated—with no essence but with varieties. The difference between 
contextual, universal, and variegated approaches to defining populism is due, 
in part, to the different types of work that deal with populism.46 The best way 
to deal with the contested nature of the term populism is to work with a 
minimal definition which can help us to identify the main character of the 
phenomenon. 
Through an ideational approach, Mudde defines populism as a “thin-
centered” ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt 
elite.” Other than that, politics in the mode of populism should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.47 The most 
important thing in Mudde’s definition lies in the way he defines populism as 
“thin-centered” ideology that distinguishes it from “thick-centered” or “full” 
ideologies (e.g., fascism, liberalism, socialism, secularism, etc.). If ideology is a 
body of normative ideas about the nature of man and society that is related to 
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a view of how the world is and should be, than “thin-centered” ideology such 
as populism have a restricted morphology, which necessarily appears 
attached to—and sometimes is even assimilated into—other ideologies.48 
Consequently, populism can take very diﬀerent shapes and seldom exists in 
pure form—it always appears in combination with other. 
The problem that arises is, why are “the people” such apparently 
essential in populism? A simple answer is that the people is an idea that is as 
flexible as populism needs it to be. Thus, we can understand that in populist 
thinking, based on Mudde’s ideational approach, commitment to the people is 
the basic value, especially insofar as their values contrast with those of elites. 
It was from this position that populism derives its anti-elitism which allows 
us to observe both the demand and supply side of the populist ideas. It also 
permits us to grasp that the phenomenon is not only and necessarily about an 
“idol” who is able to mobilize the masses. Populism can emerge and take root 
only if there are persons who share the populist set of ideas. 
By placing populism as an ideological issue, as Taggart did, populism 
relatively easy to analyze. According to Bonikowski, the problem, however, is 
that unlike most ideologies, populism is based on a rudimentary moral logic. 
In other words, populism does not oﬀer a worldview; at best, it oﬀers a 
simplistic critique of existing configurations of power.49 But in a deeper 
analysis, by placing populism in a horizon of discourse, populism is more 
complex than just ideology. 
In the level of discourse, populism is more complex than just what 
Mudd call “thin-ideology.” According to Laclau, there are three main aspects 
that form populism:50 First, populism is not a type of movement—identifiable 
with either a special social base or a particular ideological orientation—but a 
political logic. Social logics involving a rarefied system of statements—that is 
to say, a system of rules drawing a horizon within which some objects are 
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representable while others are excluded. While social logics consist in rule-
following, political logics are related to the institution of the social that 
proceeds out of social demands and is, in that sense, inherent to any process 
of social change. This change, takes place through the variable articulation of 
equivalence and difference. This in turn involves, as we have seen, the 
construction of internal frontiers and the identification of an 
“institutionalized other.” 
Second, the political logic that works behind populist reason forms the 
conceptual characterization of populism which concerning “naming and 
affect”. ‘Naming’ deals with the fact that the construction of the people is a 
radical one in the sense that the heterogeneity of the demands that the 
popular identity brings to a precarious unity has to be irreducible. This 
involves two consequences: (1) The moment of unity of popular subjects is 
given at the nominal, not at the conceptual, level. (2) Precisely because that 
name is not conceptually grounded, the limits between the demands it is 
going to embrace and those it is going to exclude will be blurred, and 
subjected to permanent contestation. Therefore, populist discourse is always 
going to be imprecise and fluctuating: not because of any cognitive failure, 
but because it tries to operate, performatively, within a social reality which is 
to a large extent heterogeneous and fluctuating. It also affects that the 
populist reason had always prelude the Symbolic before the Real. 
Third, and most important thing, relates to the logic that works behind 
populism, that is equivalential logics. In its classical form, populism 
presupposes a larger community, so the equivalential logics will cut across 
new and more heterogeneous social groups. For its constitution, the 
equivalential logics presuppose the equivalence of a plurality of demands. In 
its relation to populism, that populism requires the dichotomic division of 
society into two camps. One presenting itself as a part which claims to be the 
whole and that the popular camp presupposes, as a condition of its 
constitution, the construction of a global identity out of the equivalence of a 
plurality of social demands. 
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Based on three main aspects that form populism, we can, at least, 
conclude that the discourse which works behind populism is an attempt to 
totalize social reality into single identity by utilizing the equivalential logic at 
the expense of the differential one. Only, it must be realized that the plurality 
of social demands requires differential logic. Therefore, equivalential logic 
only works at the surface level to expenses the differential social demands.  
 
2. Cyber-Public Sphere 
The term of the public sphere, as Salvatore explained, has surged to 
worldwide significance during the 1990s, in the wake of the English 
translation of Habermas’s German Habilitation thesis The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989 [1962]).51 In his article entitled 
“Public Sphere”, Habermas defines the public sphere—although his 
development of the idea is largely based on European societies—as a domain 
of our social life where such a thing as public opinion can be formed [and] 
constituted in every conversation in which private person come together to 
form a public. Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general 
interest without being subject to coercion; thus, with the guarantee that they 
may assemble and unite freely, and express and publicize their views.52  
In technological era, what defines public sphere is no longer only the 
actual (objective) sphere, but also cyber sphere which is made possible by 
new media (the internet things). The problem is, what if the Islamic discourse 
that is present in the cyber-public sphere is related to post-truth conditions 
mediated and amplified by social media? At this point, the interplay between 
populism, Islamic discourse, and cyber-public sphere become an important 
thing to identify the nature of truth in post-truth condition. Because, the truth 
is no longer purely fact-based conception of evidence as happened in pre-
post-truth mindset in early modern period, but it involves public authority 
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which is, in some degrees, related to viral-referential opinions, interests, and 
intentions. Thus, truth shifts from being fact-based authority to viral 
revelation and popular testimony; from being substantive to a procedural 
notion.  
In the technological culture, specifically through social media 
infrastructure, these truth patterns even more massif and popularized in 
cyber-public sphere. As Sawyer explains, technology for the broadcast of real 
or imagined self-curated material renders the notion that an individual can 
produce media that is self-referentially authoritative establishes the regime 
of post-truth. Social media becomes an apparatus that implodes the concept 
of what are traditionally framed as facts. The fact that individuals can now 
curate and broadcast their own media allows the creation of an infnite 
number of “networks” which operate in a fashion that facilitates the creation 
of discourses of internally coherent “truth” that are true only in relation to 
themselves and are in fact designed to obscure, eliminate, or decenter the 
notion of what amounts to a fact.53 As the consequence, the statement or 
meme becomes true or false regarding the “network of agreements.”  
The involvement of social media which takes advantage of public 
understanding that enables the creation of network of agreement that 
transcend space-time, and even ideological boundaries has brought post-
truth condition to another situation, popular-reference authority, where 
truth measures by how some issues viral in society, without referring to solid 
evidence. The nature of truth in post-truth condition becomes mere contested 
procedural truth that appears in form of bullshits, fake news, hoaxes, framed 
image, etc. The problem is, what if the post-truth condition, which present in 
a populist form and is mediated by social media, is related to religious 
discourse in the context of society that has a high level of religious 
enthusiasm and sensitivity!? 
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MASS HYSTERIA: THE RISE OF EMOTIONAL RELATIVISM 
To relate populism with Islamic discourse, especially concerning the dynamic 
of Islamic discourse in cyber-public sphere, the conception of ummah is the closets 
meaning. That is considering, as Vedi Hadiz argues, that a central conception of 
Islamic populism is that of the ummah as proxy for “the people”—the virtuous 
masses who are juxtaposed (in classic populist fashion) against an elite 
characterised as being immoral and rapacious.54 In this section, besides the ethical, 
legal, and much more articulation, Islam will be interpreted as an ideology—a set 
of normative ideas about the nature of ummah and muslim society that is related to 
a view of how the world is and should be according to Al-Qur’an and Sunnah as the 
main sources.  
The use of the term ideology here is to describe the general process of the 
production of meanings and ideas that refer to authoritative religious sources who 
crystalized into a single meaning. The interpretation of Islam as an ideology based 
on the differentiation between Islam as religion (al-dîn) and religious thought (al-
fikr ad-dîniy) which is the result of human thinking throughout the history of 
Islamic civilization. Also, Islamic discourse will be understood in the reality of the 
latest culture, the age of the world picture. Both of these starting points are 
important to understand how Islamic populist thinking and movement manifest in 
the contemporary technological era.  
According to Raymond Williams, the term “ideology” finds three main uses: 
(1) A system of beliefs characteristic of a particular class or group; (2) A system of 
illusory beliefs—false ideas or false consciousness—which can be contrasted with 
true or scientific knowledge; (3) The general process of the production of 
meanings and ideas.55 On the other side, acording to Thompson, ideology is the 
thought of the other, the thought of someone other than oneself. Consequently, to 
characterize a view as “ideological” is already to criticize it, for “ideology” is not a 
neutral term. But in recent years that this theory has been enriched and elaborated 
through a reflection on language. Ideology represent the ideas circulate in the 
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social world as utterances, as expressions, as words which are spoken or 
inscribed.56 In John Fiske interpretation, ideology as a system of beliefs is closer to 
psychologists use of the word which refer to the way that attitudes are organized 
into a coherent pattern. While as a system of illusory beliefs, ideology becomes the 
category of illusions and false consciousness by which the ruling class maintains its 
dominance. And ideology as general process of the production of meanings and 
ideas means that ideology is the source of the second-meanings.57 
Based on the explanation above, the problem is directed to notion of the 
subject, the false subjectivity (identity). Referring to Althusser’s thesis, 1) there is 
no practice whatsoever except by and under an ideology. 2) There is no ideology 
except by the subject and for subjects. In other words, there is no ideology except 
for concrete subjects, and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the 
subject: in other words, by the category of the subject and its functioning.58 
Althusser explained that ideology works through interpellation or hailing. All 
ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, through 
the functioning of the category of the subject.59  
In the digital era which is marked by the increasingly massive penetration of 
social media in various aspects of economic life, politics, religion, culture, and even 
national security, human culture undergoes in such radical changes. This kind of 
situation also influences in how ideology manifests itself in reality. In religious 
context, these cultural changes also influence the projection of human religiosity to 
be so imaginal and artificial. There has been a reduction in the meaning of religion 
to be limited to the image market commodity, the commodities of the cultural, 
economic, even political markets. In the context of populism, these commodities 
have created mass hysteria in public sphere, and even in cybersphere. 
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In the context of society that has a high level of religious enthusiasm and 
sensitivity, the banality of everyday religiosity is preserved through parodies of 
false subjectivity. While in the context of the religiosity that is present in the midst 
of technological culture which is dominated by the power of the image and 
parodies of false subjectivity, humans are entering the condition of hyper-
religiosity; the reality that trapped in the nature of its shallowness; the reality of 
artificial faith that is no longer related to a commitment and existential demands; 
the religiosity that has been distorted from the natural character and the principle 
reference; religious reality that is interpreted based on ontology of image. The 
phenomenon of human religiosity is increasingly plunged into the chaos of the 
situation of religious consciousness that becomes so ironic, political parodies, 
crisis, parodic, commoditized, even more sporadic and brute. 
Ironically, considering that religion is so loudly discussed in various public 
space, but being impoverished into portraits of mere festivals and crowds in pop-
culture. Political, considering the increasingly widespread politicization of the 
Sacred Verses that cover the craving of the will to power behind it. Parodic, 
considering that the preachers are no longer different from mere robed clowns. 
Commoditized, considering to the increasing number of religious preachers who 
sell holy verses for the sake of mere worldly pragmatism. Crisis, considering the 
occurrence of some sort of symptom of banalization of religious discourses which 
causes the disappearance of the depth of religious meaning in realities. Sporadic, 
considering the frequency of religious discourse as mere as a tool alienate, and 
even suppress the values of justice and humanity. Human religiosity in its cultural 
anchor becomes so banal (banality of religion). 
In modern cultural situations trapped in artificial images, false subjectivity 
haills or interpellates concrete individuals which is encouraged to be subjects in a 
particular system (religion, economic, politic, etc.). At the point when false 
subjectivity and religious ideology merge with each other, populism finds its shape. 
In other words, populism finds its articulation as false mass religiosity—the mass 
hysteria driven by an “idol” who share the populist set of ideas and who is able to 
mobilize the masses. Then, in the level of popular Islamic discourse, the 
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consequences of post-truth condition (fake news, hoax, framed image, etc.) 
resonate loudly in public sphere at its artificial meaning, and even false meaning. 
Consequently, driven by equivalential logic, Islamic discourse reduced to an 
inseparable part of populism. That means, Islamic discourse no longer refers to 
authoritative religious sources and its relation to reality, but only part of popular 
discourse which is driven by religious patronages based on emotional likes or 
dislikes of the people. At this level, Islamic discourses that spread in ummah 
consciousnesses are nothing more than market commodities, both political, 
cultural, ideological, etc.  
If the basic logic of relativism the idea that something is relative to, for 
example, epistemological relativism which holds that knowledge-claims are judged 
to be justified or unjustified relative to certain epistemic standards, religious 
relativism which hold that— normatively—truth claim that religious traditions 
with specific methods for settling belief and determining what to consider right 
and holy, or that religious truth—normatively—constituted within each separate 
tradition, and if the basic situation of post-truth is emotional likes or dislikes of the 
people which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than 
appeals to emotion and personal belief, than the condition can be understood as 
the rise of emotional relativism. The nature truth in popular Islamic discourse in 
post-truth condition is nothing more than mass hysteria who interpellates ummah 
to the false religious consciousness. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: AGAINST BRUTAL-EMOTIONAL RELATIVISM 
The trajectory of ummah consciousnesses that attached to contemporary 
Islamic discourses are faced with various falsehood. Consequently, Islamic 
discourses are vulnerable to being trapped in artificial mass hysteria, thus losing 
its substance. Religion is nothing more than instrument for ideologist who hide his 
will to power, while the people are nothing more than manipulated device for 
ideologist for his own shake. I argue, contemporary relativism in the age of post-
truth more brute consequences than what nihilism and solipsism did in early 
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modern period. The nature of truth shifts from being substantive to a procedural 
notion; from being fact-based authority to viral revelation and popular testimony 
which is grounded in emotional mass hysteria. 
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